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Epistemic modalitya b s t r a c t
De Villiers (Lingua, 2007, Vol. 117, pp. 1858–1878) and others have
claimed that children come to understand false belief as they
acquire linguistic constructions for representing a proposition
and the speaker’s epistemic attitude toward that proposition. In
the current study, English-speaking children of 3 and 4 years of
age (N = 64) were asked to interpret propositional attitude con-
structions with a first- or third-person subject of the propositional
attitude (e.g., ‘‘I think the sticker is in the red box” or ‘‘The cow
thinks the sticker is in the red box”, respectively). They were also
assessed for an understanding of their own and others’ false beliefs.
We found that 4-year-olds showed a better understanding of both
third-person propositional attitude constructions and false belief
than their younger peers. No significant developmental differences
were found for first-person propositional attitude constructions.
The older children also showed a better understanding of their
own false beliefs than of others’ false beliefs. In addition, regression
analyses suggest that the older children’s comprehension of their
own false beliefs was mainly related to their understanding of
third-person propositional attitude constructions. These results
indicate that we need to take a closer look at the propositional
attitude constructions that are supposed to support children’s
false-belief reasoning. Children may come to understand their
132 S. Brandt et al. / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 151 (2016) 131–143own and others’ beliefs in different ways, and this may affect both
their use and understanding of propositional attitude constructions
and their performance in various types of false-belief tasks.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open
access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/).Introduction
A large number of studies have shown that language plays a facilitative role in children’s develop-
ment of false-belief understanding (for overviews, see Astington & Baird, 2005; Milligan, Astington, &
Dack, 2007). However, it is still unclear which aspects of language are responsible. Some researchers
have looked to discourse because children must constantly confront mismatches between what they
and their interlocutor know or do not know for pragmatically appropriate communication (e.g., Harris,
1996, 1999; Peterson & Siegal, 2000; Tomasello & Rakoczy, 2003). Others have looked to the more rep-
resentational aspects of language, in particular (a) children’s mastery of mental state terms, such as
think and know (e.g., Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Olson, 1988; Ruffman, Slade, & Crowe, 2002), and
(b) children’s mastery of propositional attitude constructions in which these mental state terms pro-
totypically occur, such as I think that he will be late again (e.g., de Villiers & de Villiers, 2000; Hale &
Tager-Flusberg, 2003; Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003; Low, 2010). In the remainder of this article, we
use linguistic terminology and refer to these propositional attitude constructions as complement-
clause constructions or just complements. These complement-clause constructions contain a main
clause expressing the attitude toward a proposition (e.g., I think) and a subordinate clause expressing
that proposition (e.g., he will be late again).
In the current study, we took a closer look at children’s understanding of these complement-clause
constructions and the parallel development of their false-belief understanding. Around the age of 4
years, children typically start to pass explicit tests of false belief (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001).
To investigate whether this developmental achievement is equally supported by different kinds of
complement-clause constructions, we compared 3- and 4-year-olds’ comprehension of
complement-clause constructions with first- and third-person subjects in the main clause (henceforth,
first-person complements, such as ‘‘I think the sticker is in the red box”, and third-person comple-
ments, such as ‘‘The cow thinks the sticker is in the red box”). We further investigated how the same
children perform in tasks testing their understanding of their own and others’ false beliefs.
Our main hypothesis was that third-person complements are more tightly related to false belief
because they are more likely to encode genuine references to mental states. Linguistic research sug-
gests that whereas first-person complements can refer to mental states, they are also regularly used
as epistemic parentheticals, which are produced to alert the listener to the relative (un)certainty of a
proposition. Phrases like I think can be translated as maybe (e.g., Thompson & Mulac, 1991; Verhagen,
2005). In other words, first-person complements are ambiguous because they can either refer to
mental states or function as (un)certainty markers (see also Manson, 2002).
Moreover, even when used as epistemic parentheticals, first-person complements are ambiguous
on another level. That is, a phrase like I think in I think it’s in the red box can express either certainty
or uncertainty, and it has been suggested that children up to the age of 5 years treat I think as if it
means I know (e.g., Bassano, 1985; Miscione, Marvin, O’Brien, & Greenberg, 1978; Naigles, 2000).
Therefore, first-person complements are highly ambiguous, and this ambiguity may affect the way
in which children interpret them and the way in which they are related to their false-belief
understanding.Production of complement-clause constructions
The idea that first-person complements do not necessarily refer to mental states is supported by
studies of spontaneous speech demonstrating that children produce first-person complements
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Tomasello (2001) looked at young English-speaking children’s production of complement clauses,
they found that at around the age of 3 years children used many mental verbs only in the first person,
as in I think it’s in there (see also Bloom, Rispoli, Gartner, & Hafitz, 1989). Following functional linguists
(e.g., Thompson & Mulac, 1991; Verhagen, 2005), they argued that in this case the I think phrase is not
being used to refer to a mental state or mental activity but rather is being used as a kind of epistemic
marker to alert the listener to the speaker’s relative uncertainty (for similar findings in German chil-
dren’s spontaneous speech, see Brandt, Lieven, & Tomasello, 2010).
Comprehension of complement-clause constructions and false belief
To investigate the developmental gap between children’s production of first-person complement-
clause constructions at around the age of 3 years (e.g., Diessel & Tomasello, 2001) and their successful
performance in explicit false-belief tests at around the age of 4 years (Wellman et al., 2001), Moore,
Bryant, and Furrow (1989) and Moore, Pure, and Furrow (1990) tested whether and when young
English-speaking children correctly interpreted first-person complements and whether they under-
stood them before they passed explicit false-belief tests. Moore and colleagues (1989) developed a
hidden-object task where two puppets indicated which of two boxes contained some candy. The pup-
pets produced first-person complements only. For example, one puppet said I think it’s in the red box,
and then the other puppet said I know it’s in the blue box. In this case, children who understood these
verbs and sentence types were expected to pick the blue box. Moore and colleagues (1989) contrasted
three mental state verbs: guess, think, and know. Overall, 3-year-olds performed at chance level,
whereas 4-year-olds tended to perform at above chance level but still performed worse than 6- and
8-year-olds. Looking at the think–know contrast in particular, the 3-year-olds, on average, went for
the correct box in 2 of 4 trials (M = 2.07), whereas the 4-year-olds, on average, went for the correct
box in 3 of 4 trials (M = 3.14). Moore and colleagues (1990) showed that, in addition, 4-year-olds’ per-
formance in this hidden-object task was strongly correlated with their performance in various explicit
tests of false belief. These findings suggest that, even though children produce first-person
complements with mental verbs before they show an explicit understanding of false belief, their
comprehension of first-person complements develops at the same time as they start to show an explicit
understanding of false belief.
A similar developmental pattern and dissociation between production and comprehension has
been observed in children’s use and understanding of epistemic modals. Like first-person comple-
ments, modal verbs, such as must and will, are ambiguous. For example, must can express necessity
(e.g., you must go to bed now) or epistemic modality (e.g., saying that must be the postman on hearing
the doorbell). Studies looking at children’s production and comprehension of modal verbs suggest that
children first use them to express notions like necessity (e.g., Wells, 1979). At around the age of
3 years, they start using the same verbs to express epistemic modality in apparently appropriate con-
texts. However, when children are tested on their comprehension of the epistemic meaning of modal
verbs, they do not seem to understand them in any systematic way until the age of 4 or 5 years, and
Papafragou (1998) suggested that children’s full understanding of the epistemic functions of modal
verbs depends on their theory-of-mind understanding (see also Moore, Pure, & Furrow, 1990).
For mental verbs and complement clauses, it has been suggested that children’s comprehension
and correct use of the more complex (i.e., mental state) functions do not just depend on, but also sup-
port, their theory-of-mind development (e.g., Astington & Baird, 2005; de Villiers, 2007; Milligan et al.,
2007). In the current study, we explored the possibility that children’s theory-of-mind development is
mainly associated with children’s understanding of third-person complements. This assumption is
suggested by a number of studies that found that caregivers’ talk about their own mental states
(e.g., I think this is a golf ball) shows weaker links to children’s false-belief understanding than their
talk about others’ mental states, including those of the children (e.g., you think this is a golf ball)
(Adrián, Clemente, & Villanueva, 2007; Booth, Hall, Robison, & Kim, 1997; Howard Gola, 2012;
Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2006). Howard, Mayeux, and Naigles (2008) also found that mothers’ use
of first-person complements does not support children’s ability to systematically distinguish between
the epistemic functions of I think, expressing relative uncertainty, and I know, expressing certainty.
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and believe) can express either certainty or uncertainty. For example, when a child hears an utterance
like I think it’s bedtime now from their mother, the mother is pretty certain that it indeed is bedtime (cf.
Howard et al., 2008; Naigles, 2000). In this case, the meaning of I think cannot easily be distinguished
from the meaning of I know (see also Bassano, 1985; Miscione et al., 1978). Howard and colleagues
(2008) found that in the linguistic input of 3- and 4-year-old English-speaking children, more than half
of the phrases containing the verb think were used to express certainty rather than uncertainty, that
think was most often used with first-person subjects, and that these phrases did not directly support
children’s understanding of false belief and the epistemic functions of mental verbs.
To summarize, previous research suggests that first-person complements do not necessarily refer
to mental states, and thus their use in children’s own language and in their input does not directly
support children’s false-belief understanding. Neither does the everyday use of first-person comple-
ments seem to support children’s understanding of the semantics of mental verbs and the
complement-clause constructions in which these verbs are used (Howard et al., 2008). What has
not been investigated yet is (a) whether young children find it easier to distinguish the semantics
and epistemic functions of mental verbs when they are used in third-person complements (e.g., she
thinks the sticker is in the red box vs. she knows the sticker is in the blue box) as opposed to first-
person complements and (b) how young children’s understanding of third-person complements is
related to their false-belief understanding.
First-person versus third-person complements and false-belief understanding
In the current study, we modified the hidden-object task (cf. Moore, Bryant, & Furrow, 1989) to
directly compare 3- and 4-year-olds’ comprehension of first- and third-person complements. For
example, in the first-person version, one puppet said I think the sticker is in the red box, and the other
puppet said I know the sticker is in the blue box. In the third-person version, the experimenter spoke for
the puppets: The cow thinks the sticker is in the red box. The pig knows the sticker is in the blue box. In
addition, we used a more balanced set of false-belief tasks that allowed us to directly compare chil-
dren’s understanding of their own and others’ false beliefs and how this relates to their understanding
of first- and third-person complements.
Based on the assumption that phrases like I think in first-person complements can express either
certainty or uncertainty (e.g., Howard et al., 2008), we expected children to perform worse on the
first-person I think–I know contrast than on the third-person the cow thinks–the pig knows contrast.
Based on the assumption that first-person complements can either refer to mental states or function
as (un)certainty markers (e.g., Diessel & Tomasello, 2001), we also expected stronger developmental
associations between third-person complements and false-belief understanding than between first-
person complements and false belief.Method
Participants
The children were recruited through a child participant database and tested in a quiet room at the
university of a medium-sized English city. In total, 32 young 3-year-olds (M = 3 years 4 months,
range = 3;1 [years;months] to 3;5, 17 girls) and 32 young 4-year-olds (M = 4 years 4 months,
range = 4;1 to 4;4, 15 girls) participated in the study. One additional 3-year-old was tested but needed
to be excluded from the analyses because she failed the pretest (described below). All children were
English-speaking monolinguals. None of the participants had any known language impairment.
Design and materials
All children started with the hidden-object task (cf. Moore et al., 1989) and did four false-belief
tests afterward. As described in more detail below, we used the classic unexpected content and change
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sion of the change-of-location test, which tests children’s understanding of their own false belief
(Buttelmann, 2016). In the hidden-object task, we had two conditions that were tested between par-
ticipants. In each age group, 16 children (8 girls) were tested in each condition. In the first-person con-
dition, for each trial children heard two contrastive statements from two hand puppets (a cow and a
pig). The complement clauses were used with one of two mental verbs and a first-person singular sub-
ject in the main clause (e.g., pig: I think the sticker is in the blue box; cow: I know the sticker is in the red
box). As in one of Moore and colleagues’ (1989) conditions, the two mental verbs that were contrasted
were think, marking relative uncertainty, and know, marking certainty. In the first-person condition,
the test sentences were prerecorded and played from little speakers hidden under the hand puppets.
In the third-person condition, the experimenter spoke for the puppets and the children heard, for
example, The pig thinks the sticker is in the blue box; The cow knows the sticker is in the red box.
Each child received eight trials. Across trials, we counterbalanced the order of the statements
(whether the first statement contained think or know in the main clause), the assignment of the
statements to the hand puppets (whether the pig or cow knew or thought), and the assignment of
the statements to the boxes (whether it was known or thought that the sticker was hidden in the
red or blue box).
Procedure
All children were tested by a female experimenter who sat opposite them at a small table. For each
trial, the child saw two opaque boxes on the table—always a red one and a blue one. The red box was
always placed to the left of the child.
The experiment started with a pretest. The experimenter told the child that she, the pig, and the
cow had hidden many stickers in the boxes and that the pig and cowwould help the child to find these
stickers. She also told the child that the pig and cow might not remember all the hiding places. For
each of four trials a new pair of boxes was placed on the table in front of the child. After the experi-
menter put the two boxes on the table, she asked the puppets, Can you help X [child’s name] find the
sticker? Which box is the sticker in?
In the pretest, the child heard two non-contrastive statements about the location of the sticker
from the two hand puppets. One statement was affirmative and the other was negated (e.g., pig:
The sticker is in the red box; cow: The sticker is not in the blue box). Whether the cow or the pig used
the affirmative or negated statement, and which statement came first, was counterbalanced. In the
pretest, children were allowed to choose and open one of the two boxes right away. Children who
picked the right box in at least three of four trials continued with the experiment. Children who scored
lower than three of four trials received two additional trials. If they then picked the right box in four of
six trials, they also continued with the experiment. As indicated above, we needed to exclude one
3-year-old because she did not reach this criterion.
In each experimental trial, children needed to choose one box but were not allowed to look into any
of the boxes before they were finished with all eight trials. In the first-person condition, the hand pup-
pets uttered the prerecorded test sentences. In the third-person condition, the hand puppets first
whispered into the experimenter’s ear, and the experimenter then uttered the test sentences. The
whispering did not contain any actual words, and the experimenter produced the third-person com-
plements right after the whispering. No additional instructions were given to the child. Because the
task was quite demanding, after four experimental trials there was a break during which the experi-
menter played a puzzle game with the child. They played this game for approximately 5 min and then
continued with the second set of experimental trials. Before they did the false-belief tests, children
were allowed to look into the boxes they chose and collect their stickers. Note that, finally, all boxes
contained stickers so that children were not differently rewarded before they began the subsequent
false-belief tests.
For testing children’s understanding of false belief, we presented participants with four different
tasks. In the classic change-of-location test (Wimmer & Perner, 1983), children needed to answer a
test question about another person’s false belief. The experimenter told the story and acted it out with
two little dolls and props: Sally puts a ball into her basket, Sally leaves the room, Ann transfers the ball
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the test question (Where will Sally look for her ball?), (b) the reality control question (Where is the ball
really?), and (c) the memory control question (Where did Sally put her ball in the first place?).
The change-of-location own-belief test is based on the classic change-of-location paradigm but
tests children’s understanding of their own false belief (Buttelmann, 2016). For this, things were
arranged such that children searched in the incorrect location for a small toy. The experimenter placed
two boxes (a green one and a pink one) on the table and told the child that she was going to hide a
small toy ball in one of them. She then put an occluder on the table to block the child’s view and
put the toy ball into one of the boxes (the pink one in Fig. 1A and B). At the same time, she slightly
manipulated the position and the cover of the other box (the green one in Fig. 1). So, after the occluder
was removed, it looked like the experimenter had manipulated one box, but had not touched the other
one (see Fig. 1C and Buttelmann, 2016, for details regarding the procedure of this test). She then asked
the child (a) the manipulation control question (Where is the ball?). Except for one 3-year old, all chil-
dren pointed to the box that looked like it had been manipulated and thus held a false belief concern-
ing the location of the ball. The experimenter then showed the child that this box was actually empty
and that the ball was hidden in the other box. She then put the ball back in the same box (i.e., the one
that did not look like it had been manipulated) and asked (b) the test question (Where did you first
think the ball was?). As in the classic change-of-location test, the experimenter also asked (c) the reality
control question (Where is the ball now?).
The unexpected content (or ‘‘Smarties”) test included questions about both children’s own false
belief and another person’s false belief (Perner et al., 1987). We followed the original procedure of
the task and used a Smarties tube that was filled with crayons. The experimenter first asked the child
what he or she thought was is in there. After the child said Smarties, chocolate, sweets, or something
similar, the experimenter showed the child the actual content of the box (crayons). She then put
the crayons back into the tube, closed it, and asked the child three questions: (a) the memory control
question (Can you remember what’s inside here?), (b) the own-belief test question (What did you first
think was inside here?), and (c) the other-belief test question (What will pig think is inside this box?).A
DC
B
Fig. 1. Depictions from a 3-year-old girl indicating her responses in the change-of-location own-belief test.
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anced across children.
Thus, we were able to test children’s understanding of their own and others’ false beliefs in scenar-
ios involving unexpected contents and the change of an object’s location. The unexpected content and
change-of-location tests were presented as blocks, and the order was counterbalanced. Within these
blocks, we also counterbalanced the order of own and others’ false-belief questions. Test sessions
lasted 20 to 25 min.Scoring
Children’s choices in the hidden-object task were scored as correct when participants chose the box
marked by I know in the first-person condition and the box marked by the pig knows or the cow knows
in the third-person condition.
For each false-belief task, childrengot a score of 1 (pass) if they correctly answeredboth the test ques-
tion and the corresponding control question(s). Overall, eight 3-year-olds failed to correctly answer the
reality control question (about the actual location of the object) in the change-of-location task (five in
the change-of-locationown-belief test and three in the change-of-locationother-belief test). In addition,
six 3-year-olds did not give a correct answer to thememory control question (about the actual content of
the Smarties tube) in the unexpected content task. Among the 4-year-olds, only two gave incorrect
answers to the reality control questions (about the actual location of the object) in the change-of-
location own-belief test. Trials in which children did not answer the control question(s) correctly were
dropped from the analyses. That is, for that specific false-belief test, children did not get a score of either
0 (fail) or 1 (pass). For the unexpected content task, thismeans that they did not get a score for either the
own- or other-false-belief test question. However, no child failed all control questions. So, each child got
a score of 0 (fail) or 1 (pass) for at least one false-belief measure and was considered in the subsequent
analyses.Results
First, we analyzed children’s performance in the hidden-object task. A 2 (Age: 3- vs. 4-year-olds) by
2 (Condition: first- vs. third-person complements) analysis of variance (ANOVA) suggested that there
was a significant interaction between age and condition, F(1, 60) = 10.56, p = .002. Therefore, we ran
separate analyses for the two age groups. The 3-year-olds performed at chance in both the first-
and third-person conditions (first-person: M = 52.3% of trials, SD = 13.1; Wilcoxon test: Z = .577,
N = 16, p = .564; third-person: M = 50.0% of trials, SD = 12.9; Wilcoxon test: Z = .054, N = 16, p = .957)
(see Fig. 2). Similarly, there was no significant difference between the younger children’s
performances in the first- and third-person conditions (Mann–Whitney U-test: U = 117.0, Z = .443,
Nfirst-person = 16, Nthird-person = 16, p = .657). The 4-year-olds, in contrast, performed above chance in
both conditions (first-person: M = 58.6% of trials, SD = 16.3; Wilcoxon test: Z = 2.08, N = 16, p = .038;
third-person: M = 79.7% of trials, SD = 15.1; Wilcoxon test: Z = 3.434, N = 16, p = .001). Unlike the
3-year-olds, the older children also performed significantly better in the third-person condition than
in the first-person condition (Mann–Whitney U-test: U = 46.0, Z = 3.157, Nfirst-person = 16,
Nthird-person = 16, p = .002) (see Fig. 2). When we directly compared the two age groups, we found that
the 4-year-olds performed better than the 3-year-olds in the third-person condition (Mann–Whitney
U-test: U = 238, Z = 4.23, N3-year-olds = 16, N4-year-olds = 16, p < .001). For the first-person condition,
however, we did not find any significant age differences (Mann–Whitney U-test: U = 148, Z = .793,
N3-year-olds = 16, N4-year-olds = 16, p = .468).
Table 1 shows the number and percentage of children who passed each false-belief test in each age
group. Remember that we had to exclude a number of 3-year-olds and two 4-year-olds from some
trials because they did not answer the corresponding control question(s) correctly. In addition, one
3-year-old did not have a false belief in the own-false-belief version of the change-of-location test.
Therefore, depending on the task, the total number of 3-year-olds included in the analyses ranged
from 26 to 29 and the number of 4-year-olds included in the analyses ranged from 30 to 32.
Fig. 2. Mean number of correct trials in the hidden-object task as a function of age and condition. The horizontal line indicates
chance level. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Table 1
Numbers and percentages of children who passed the false-belief tests out of children who correctly answered the corresponding
control questions.
False-belief test Version 3-year-olds 4-year-olds
Change of location Own 35% (9/26) 83% (25/30)
Other 24% (7/29) 63% (20/32)
Unexpected content Own 31% (8/26) 84% (27/32)
Other 35% (9/26) 50% (16/32)
138 S. Brandt et al. / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 151 (2016) 131–143The 4-year-olds performed better in the own-false-belief tests than in the other-false-belief tests.
No significant differences were found between the own-false-belief versions of the unexpected con-
tent test and the change-of-location test (McNemar test: N = 50, p = .804). Similarly, there was no sig-
nificant difference between the other-false-belief versions of the two tasks (McNemar test: N = 56,
p = .839). Therefore, both tasks were combined for percentages of trials passed in the own- and
other-false-belief tests. The 4-year-olds performed above chance in the own-false-belief tests
(M = 84.4% of trials, SD = 29.6; Wilcoxon test: Z = 4.315, N = 32, p < .001) and at chance in the other-
false-belief tests (M = 56.3% of trials, SD = 39.7; Wilcoxon test: Z = .894, N = 32, p = .371). The 3-year-
olds performed below chance in both the own- and other-false-belief tests (own: M = 31.3% of trials,
SD = 37.6; Wilcoxon test: Z = 2.558, N = 32, p = .011; other: M = 25.8% of trials, SD = 31.3; Wilcoxon
test: Z = 3.441, N = 31, p = .001). In accordance with these results, we found that the 4-year-olds per-
formed better than the younger group in both own-false-belief tests (Mann–Whitney U-test: U = 857,
Z = 4.98, N3-year-olds = 31, N4-year-olds = 32, p < .001) and other-false-belief tests (Mann–Whitney U-test:
U = 704, Z = 3.06, N3-year-olds = 31, N4-year-olds = 32, p = .002).
The pairwise comparisons presented so far suggest that between the ages of 3 and 4 years, children
develop a better understanding of third-person complements and of their own false belief. Their
understanding of others’ false beliefs also develops, but even the 4-year-olds still performed at chance
in tasks testing the understanding of others’ false beliefs. To further investigate whether there is a
relationship between children’s understanding of first- and third-person complements and their
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model, we entered children’s performance in the hidden-object task (percentage trials correct), condi-
tion (first- vs. third-person complements), and age (3- vs. 4-year-olds) to predict their performance in
own-false-belief tasks. Condition and age were coded as categorical variables (third-person and
4-year-olds, respectively). Performance in the hidden-object task was coded as a continuous numer-
ical variable. We found main effects for age, performance in the hidden-object task, and condition as
well as a three-way interaction among all the factors (see Table 2). Together with the pairwise com-
parisons presented above, these main effects and complex interaction suggest that it is the older chil-
dren’s growing understanding of third-person complements that is related to their improved
understanding of their own false belief.
When we entered the same variables to predict children’s performance in other-false-belief tasks,
we found a main effect for their performance in the hidden-object task and a two-way interaction
between age and performance in the hidden-object task. Together with the pairwise comparisons
presented above, this suggests that only the 4-year-olds’ understanding of complement clauses was
positively related to their understanding of others’ false beliefs (see Table 3).Discussion
In the current study, we found developmental differences between 3- and 4-year-old English-
speaking children’s understanding of third-person complements and between 3- and 4-year-olds’
understanding of false belief. In particular, the older children performed above chance level and also
significantly better than the younger age group in the third-person condition of the hidden-object task
(with third-person complements) and in the own-false-belief tests. Unlike the younger age group, the
4-year-olds also performed just above chance in the first-person condition of the hidden-object task
(with first-person complements), but their performance in this condition did not significantly differ
from that of the 3-year-olds. In addition, the 4-year-olds performed at chance level in the other-
false-belief tasks, whereas the 3-year-olds were below chance and significantly worse than the older
age group. Together with these pairwise comparisons, the main effects and complex interactions in
the regression analyses suggest that the older children’s understanding of own false belief was posi-
tively related to their understanding of third-person complements. Their developing understanding of
others’ false beliefs seems to be related to their understanding of both first- and third-person comple-
ments. These findings support our main hypothesis that the developmental link between third-person
complements and false-belief understanding should be stronger than the relation between first-
person complements and false belief because third-person complements are more likely to encode
genuine reference to mental states and mental processes (e.g., Diessel & Tomasello, 2001; Howard
et al., 2008; Manson, 2002). In addition, the older children found it easier to distinguish the semantics
of the mental verbs think and know in a third-person context than in a first-person context, which
supports the assumption that the semantics of mental verbs is less ambiguous when used with
third-person subjects (cf. Howard et al., 2008).
We found no clear developmental links between first-person complements and false-belief
understanding. In the hidden-object task, the 4-year-olds did not perform significantly better withTable 2
Linear regression model to predict children’s understanding of own false belief based on age, performance in the hidden-object
task, and condition.
Predictor Estimate SE t p
(Intercept) 0.46 0.35 1.33 .19
Age (4-year-olds) 0.98 0.47 2.10 <.05
Condition (third-person) 1.27 0.48 2.63 <.05
Hidden-object task (% correct) 1.47 0.64 2.30 <.05
Age * Condition 1.44 0.74 1.95 .06
Age * Hidden-Object Task 0.98 0.83 1.19 .24
Condition * Hidden-Object Task 2.46 0.91 2.70 <.01
Age * Condition * Hidden-Object Task 2.62 1.19 2.20 <.05
Table 3
Linear regression model to predict children’s understanding of others’ false belief based on age, performance in the hidden-object
task, and condition.
Predictor Estimate SE t p
(Intercept) 3.19 0.75 4.25 <.001
Age (4-year-olds) 1.36 1.02 1.34 .19
Condition (third-person) 2.08 1.04 2.00 .05
Hidden-object task (% correct) 2.90 1.38 2.10 <.05
Age * Condition 1.66 1.59 1.04 .30
Age * Hidden-Object Task 3.61 1.78 2.02 <.05
Condition * Hidden-Object Task 3.42 1.97 1.74 .09
Age * Condition * Hidden-Object Task 3.40 2.57 1.32 .19
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for children’s understanding of false belief in the sense that the 4-year-olds were significantly better
than the 3-year-olds despite the older group being only at chance on others’ false beliefs. It could also
be possible that the understanding of first-person complements was linked to children’s understand-
ing of their own false beliefs. But the regression analysis and pairwise comparisons suggest that only
the third-person complements, not the first-person complements, were positively linked to children’s
understanding of their own false beliefs. These findings provide further support for the assumption
that it is third-person complements that are intrinsically related to children’s development of false-
belief reasoning. We suggest that first-person complements show weaker links to children’s false-
belief development because they do not necessarily refer to mental states and are ambiguous even
when they are used as epistemic markers (cf. Diessel & Tomasello, 2001; Howard et al., 2008).
However, previous studies did find correlations between children’s understanding of first-person
complements and false belief as well as developmental differences between 3- and 4-year-olds’
understanding of first-person complements with mental verbs (e.g., Howard et al., 2008; Moore
et al., 1989, 1990). The discrepancies between the current study and previous studies might be due
to methodological differences. For example, Moore and colleagues’ (1989) finding that there were
developmental differences for children’s understanding of first-person complements might be due
to the fact that the age ranges applied in that study were much wider than those applied in the current
study (i.e., the 4-year-olds were between the ages of 4 and 5). Therefore, the effect might have been
driven by the older participants. Another possible explanation is that in Moore and colleagues’ original
study the experimenter produced all test sentences, whereas we used prerecorded test sentences in
the first-person condition. However, when we did a similar study with German-speaking children,
the test sentences were produced live in both conditions of the hidden-object task as in Moore and
colleagues’ study. The pattern of results was similar to that in the current study; we found develop-
mental differences only for third-person complements and false-belief understanding (Brandt &
Buttelmann, 2015).
As mentioned before, previous studies also found correlations between children’s understanding of
first-person complements and their general understanding of false belief (Howard et al., 2008; Moore
et al., 1990). However, unlike the current study, previous investigations have not systematically dis-
tinguished between children’s understanding of their own and others’ false beliefs. For example,
Howard and colleagues (2008) also used the unexpected content test but gave children a combined
score for their answers to the questions about their own and someone else’s false beliefs. When we
systematically distinguished between children’s understanding of their own and others’ false beliefs,
we found a positive relation between the older children’s developing understanding of others’ false
beliefs and their comprehension of both first- and third-person complements (see regression analysis
in Table 3). However, the older children’s understanding of their own false beliefs was more advanced
than their understanding of others’ false beliefs and was positively related only to their understanding
of third-person complements (see regression analysis in Table 2).
The relationship between first-person complements and false-belief understanding is probably due
to the fact that although phrases like I think and I know are often used just like adverbials expressing
(un)certainty (e.g., Diessel & Tomasello, 2001; Thompson & Mulac, 1991; Verhagen, 2005), this
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Most of the time, we do not use these phrases to explicitly refer to mental states. Still, even using them
to express different degrees of certainty requires some concept of mind. Indeed, recent proposals sug-
gest that even if first-person complements are not used to refer to mental states directly, their mastery
may bootstrap young children into understanding true reference to mental states. This might be
because children notice that the verbs they use and comprehend as a signal of, for example, (un)cer-
tainty are being used in a slightly different way and might be used and comprehended as more or less
explicit reference to mental states (Gordon, 1995; Tomasello & Rakoczy, 2003). Children’s comprehen-
sion of mental verbs in first-person contexts is also likely to be informed by their understanding of
mental verbs in other contexts, such as third-person complements, where these verbs are more likely
to refer to mental states. However, as has been shown for a variety of linguistic terms and construc-
tions (for an overview, see Tomasello, 2003), developing a more abstract, context-independent repre-
sentation of mental verbs takes time. And, as our current and previous findings suggest, the
acquisition of an abstract representation of mental verbs also interacts with children’s false-belief
development.
A similar developmental story has been put forward for the acquisition of modal verbs and other
forms of epistemic markers and evidentials, such as sentence-final particles, where children use
apparently semantically and/or syntactically complex terms and structures appropriately before they
understand the full range of concepts behind these terms and structures (e.g., Aksu-Koç, Ögel-Balaban,
& Alp, 2009; Matsui, Yamamoto, & McCagg, 2006; Papafragou, 1998; Papafragou, Li, Choi, & Han,
2007). For example, children start using the modal auxiliary will at around the age of 2.5 years
(Wells, 1979). However, early in development, this modal auxiliary is most likely to be used to com-
municate intention. Only at around the age of 5 years do children use will to express how certain they
are about something (e.g., saying that will be the postman on hearing the doorbell) (Wells, 1979). This
latter use is referred to as epistemic modality, and Papafragou (1998) argued that children’s compre-
hension and correct use of modal verbs with an epistemic function depends on their theory-of-mind
development. To grasp the epistemic function of modal verbs, children need to have developed a
‘‘representational model of mind” (Forguson & Gopnik, 1988, as cited in Papafragou 1998, p. 383).
However, Papafragou also suggested that this epistemic function is related to other, more basic func-
tions of modal verbs and that it is, indeed, not always easy to distinguish between epistemic and other
kinds of modals when looking at spontaneous speech. It seems possible that once children have
acquired a theory of mind, they extend the more basic root functions of modal verbs expressing inten-
tion, ability, obligation, and so on to the more complex epistemic functions of modal expression.
For mental verbs and complement clauses, it has been suggested that children’s comprehension
and correct use of the more complex functions not only depend on but also support their theory-
of-mind development (e.g., Astington & Baird, 2005; de Villiers, 2007; Milligan et al., 2007). When
children start using mental verbs and complement clauses, they tend to use first-person complements
with restricted phrases and fixed discourse functions (Köymen, Lieven, & Brandt, 2016). Most impor-
tant, it has been claimed that children’s first uses of mental verbs and complements do not refer to
mental states (e.g., Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Diessel & Tomasello, 2001; Shatz, Wellman, & Silber,
1983). Nevertheless, children start to talk about their own mental states at around the age of 3 years
(Bartsch and Wellman, 1995). Results from the current study and previous research suggest that this
talk about ownmental states might be related to children’s developing understanding of (others’) false
beliefs. However, third-person (and possibly also second-person) complements show a stronger devel-
opmental link with children’s understanding of false belief. As has been suggested by de Villiers
(2007), complement clauses serve as representational tools for children’s (and adults’) false-belief
understanding because ‘‘the complement is embedded under the verb and takes the particular per-
spective or point of view of the subject, not the speaker, licensing also the subject’s terms of reference
even when these are not the speaker’s” (p. 1868). In other words, third-person complement-clause
constructions (e.g., she thinks he’ll be late) allow us to distinguish between our own and someone else’s
perspective (e.g., she). First-person complements, on the other hand, express only one perspective
because the subject (e.g., I in I think he’ll be late) refers to the speaker herself.
The current data do not allow us to make substantial claims about the causal relationship between
developments in language and theory of mind, but previous studies suggest that language supports
142 S. Brandt et al. / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 151 (2016) 131–143explicit false-belief understanding rather than the other way around (see meta-analysis by Milligan
et al., 2007). Results from the current study allow more detailed hypotheses, which need to be tested
in follow-up training and longitudinal studies. Our findings suggest that even though first-person
complements also play a role in children’s developing understanding of false belief, it is the under-
standing of third-person complements that shows a parallel development with that of false belief.
In particular, children’s understanding of their own false belief develops together with their under-
standing of third-person complements. A more general and explicit understanding of both own and
others’ false beliefs might develop out of children’s understanding of own beliefs, very likely sup-
ported by their understanding of first- and third-person complements. In both linguistic and sociocog-
nitive development, children develop more abstract representations of mental verbs and belief as they
discover commonalities across different discourse contexts.
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